# Topics in the design of political and economic mechanisms (game theory , voting). [electronic resource] / Mauricio Soares. Bugarin

Bugarin , Mauricio SoaresBib ID | vtls000566596 |

稽核項 | 77 p. |

電子版 | |

附註項 | 數位化論文典藏聯盟 |

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$a Topics in the design of political and economic mechanisms (game theory , voting). $h [electronic resource] / $c Mauricio Soares. Bugarin

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$a 77 p.

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$a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 58-10, Section: A, page: 4021.

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$a Adviser: Steven Williams.

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$a Thesis (PH.D.)--Universtiy of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1997.

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$a The present dissertation is composed of three essays on the use of mechanism design in political sciences and economics.

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$a The first essay offers a rational choice explanation for political ticket splitting. It considers a game-theoretic model of voting and bargaining within Congress and between Congress and the president. When parties are ideologically oriented and voters' utilities are state dependent, the model shows that if there is uncertainty about the true state of the world, ticket splitting emerges as a mechanism voters may use in order to insure themselves against extreme policies in bad states of nature.

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$a The second essay presents a model of a partnership that requires initial investment. The production technology depends on partners' effort choices and, possibly, on an exogenous stochastic term. When the technology is deterministic or the realization of the stochastic term is fully observable, the essay shows that the need for an investor is sufficient to ensure efficiency: efficient sharing rules arise as outcomes of optimal contracts between the investor and the partners. Therefore, the need for investment establishes a mechanism that solves the free rider problem in the partnership. This result illustrates how a principal-agent structure can arise in a partnership. Moreover, it shows how some asymmetry in partners' production inputs can be used as an efficiency-generating device.

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$a Finally, the third essay analyzes conditions for the convexifiability of an agent's utility $u(a)$ viewed a function of his type. The study shows that if the set of types A is an m-dimensional rectangle, $m\ge1,$ then u can be assumed convex in a without loss of generality. In particular, in any unidimensional model where A is convex and compact, u is essentially convex. Furthermore, if A is a compact, strictly convex set and its boundary $\partial A$ is a level set of a nonsingular function, the study derives conditions on A and u ensuring that there exists a change of variables H such that $B=H\sp{-1}(A)$ is a convex set and the function $U=u\circ H:B\to\IR$ is strictly convex.

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$a 數位化論文典藏聯盟 $b PQDT $c 台灣大學(2001~2002)

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$a Economics, Theory.

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$a Political Science, General.

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$a University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign.

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摘要 | The present dissertation is composed of three essays on the use of mechanism design in political sciences and economics. The first essay offers a rational choice explanation for political ticket splitting. It considers a game-theoretic model of voting and bargaining within Congress and between Congress and the president. When parties are ideologically oriented and voters' utilities are state dependent, the model shows that if there is uncertainty about the true state of the world, ticket splitting emerges as a mechanism voters may use in order to insure themselves against extreme policies in bad states of nature. The second essay presents a model of a partnership that requires initial investment. The production technology depends on partners' effort choices and, possibly, on an exogenous stochastic term. When the technology is deterministic or the realization of the stochastic term is fully observable, the essay shows that the need for an investor is sufficient to ensure efficiency: efficient sharing rules arise as outcomes of optimal contracts between the investor and the partners. Therefore, the need for investment establishes a mechanism that solves the free rider problem in the partnership. This result illustrates how a principal-agent structure can arise in a partnership. Moreover, it shows how some asymmetry in partners' production inputs can be used as an efficiency-generating device. Finally, the third essay analyzes conditions for the convexifiability of an agent's utility $u(a)$ viewed a function of his type. The study shows that if the set of types A is an m-dimensional rectangle, $m\ge1,$ then u can be assumed convex in a without loss of generality. In particular, in any unidimensional model where A is convex and compact, u is essentially convex. Furthermore, if A is a compact, strictly convex set and its boundary $\partial A$ is a level set of a nonsingular function, the study derives conditions on A and u ensuring that there exists a change of variables H such that $B=H\sp{-1}(A)$ is a convex set and the function $U=u\circ H:B\to\IR$ is strictly convex. |

附註 | Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 58-10, Section: A, page: 4021. Adviser: Steven Williams. Thesis (PH.D.)--Universtiy of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, 1997. 數位化論文典藏聯盟 |

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