The illusion of delayed incentives [electronic resource] / Dilip Y. Soman.

Soman, Dilip Y.
Bib ID
vtls001054649
出版項
Ann Arbor, Mich. : ProQuest Information and learning
稽核項
101 p.
電子版
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$a Soman, Dilip Y.
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$a The illusion of delayed incentives $h [electronic resource] / $c Dilip Y. Soman.
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$a Ann Arbor, Mich. : $b ProQuest Information and learning
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$a 101 p.
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$a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 58-01, Section: A, page: 0228.
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$a Adviser: Sanjay K. Dhar.
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$a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 1997.
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$a Manufacturers often offer delayed incentives like mail-in rebates and premiums by mail in which the savings is not delivered immediately at the time of brand purchase. The future saving in such incentives are contingent on some effort that the consumer needs to perform. In contrast to incentives like coupons in which the choice of a brand and the redemption of the incentive occur at the same time, the effects of such a delayed incentive on choice and redemption are separated by time.
520
$a The effect of a delayed incentive on choice will be determined by the difference between the perceived values of the savings and effort at the purchase occasion, while the effect on redemption will be determined by the difference between their actual values. In this research, we propose that the savings is weighted more heavily than the effort at the purchase occasion, and consequently a savings-effort tradeoff which looks very rosy at the time of purchase starts looking unattractive at the time of redemption. Thus, as we experimentally demonstrate, a consumer who is influenced by the incentive to buy a particular brand may not end up redeeming the incentive. We propose and explore potential explanations of the underlying process by which consumers evaluate future benefits and effort. Further, we empirically test for the profitability of a delayed incentive and also use an analytical model to derive profitability implications. Results show that for a given level of effort, profits are an inverse U shaped function of the face value of the incentive. Further, the optimal face value increases as the level of effort required to redeem the effort increases.
520
$a In this dissertation, we first define delayed incentives and outline the scope and objectives of this research. Next we present a theoretical framework, derive hypothesis for the effect of face value and level of effort and experimentally test these hypotheses. We model the profitability or delayed incentives and explore potential explanations before concluding with managerial implications and directions for future research.
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$a Business Administration, Marketing.
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$a Psychology, Behavioral.
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$a The University of Chicago.
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摘要
Manufacturers often offer delayed incentives like mail-in rebates and premiums by mail in which the savings is not delivered immediately at the time of brand purchase. The future saving in such incentives are contingent on some effort that the consumer needs to perform. In contrast to incentives like coupons in which the choice of a brand and the redemption of the incentive occur at the same time, the effects of such a delayed incentive on choice and redemption are separated by time.
The effect of a delayed incentive on choice will be determined by the difference between the perceived values of the savings and effort at the purchase occasion, while the effect on redemption will be determined by the difference between their actual values. In this research, we propose that the savings is weighted more heavily than the effort at the purchase occasion, and consequently a savings-effort tradeoff which looks very rosy at the time of purchase starts looking unattractive at the time of redemption. Thus, as we experimentally demonstrate, a consumer who is influenced by the incentive to buy a particular brand may not end up redeeming the incentive. We propose and explore potential explanations of the underlying process by which consumers evaluate future benefits and effort. Further, we empirically test for the profitability of a delayed incentive and also use an analytical model to derive profitability implications. Results show that for a given level of effort, profits are an inverse U shaped function of the face value of the incentive. Further, the optimal face value increases as the level of effort required to redeem the effort increases.
In this dissertation, we first define delayed incentives and outline the scope and objectives of this research. Next we present a theoretical framework, derive hypothesis for the effect of face value and level of effort and experimentally test these hypotheses. We model the profitability or delayed incentives and explore potential explanations before concluding with managerial implications and directions for future research.
附註
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 58-01, Section: A, page: 0228.
Adviser: Sanjay K. Dhar.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 1997.
合著者
ISBN/ISSN
9780591285970