Auditor resignation disclosures [electronic resource] / Keith Andrew Bockus.

Bockus, Keith Andrew.
Bib ID
vtls001054991
出版項
Ann Arbor, Mich. : ProQuest Information and learning
稽核項
80 p.
電子版
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$a Bockus, Keith Andrew.
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$a Auditor resignation disclosures $h [electronic resource] / $c Keith Andrew Bockus.
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$a Ann Arbor, Mich. : $b ProQuest Information and learning
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$a 80 p.
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$a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 59-05, Section: A, page: 1653.
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$a Advisers: Katherine Schipper; Mark Zmijewski.
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$a Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 1998.
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$a The purpose of this study is to assess the economic characteristics that distinguish firms whose auditor switch is characterized as a resignation from those whose auditor switch is characterized as a dismissal. I propose that auditor concerns over the reliability of the client's financial statements, and the associated litigation or reputation risk, can lead the auditor to end its relationship with the client, and that such switches are more likely to be characterized as resignations than dismissals. I base my predictions on the analytical model in Bockus and Gigler (Journal of Accounting Research (1998)).
520
$a In my empirical tests, I use measures related to the misstatement of financial statements to characterize the differences between firms whose switch was characterized as a resignation ("resignation firms") and a matched sample of firms whose switch was characterized as a dismissal ("dismissal firms").
520
$a I examine three categories of measures of the risk of financial statement misstatement. "Audit risk assessment" measures correspond to the factors that GAAS asserts to be related to the risk of material misstatement; generally, these measures are observable firm characteristics related to financial distress or poor financial performance and to pre-switch auditor-client conflict, violations of securities laws, and misstatements. "Evaluation of audit test results" measures include current (at the date of the auditor switch) auditor-client disagreements and reportable events. "Ex post evidence of misstatement" measures are related to post-switch corrections of misstatements (restatements and industry-adjusted accruals).
520
$a My results are consistent with the resignation disclosure signaling auditor concerns about the reliability of the client's financial statements. I find evidence that the auditor resignation disclosure is significantly associated with client bankruptcy within two years of the auditor switch. I additionally find evidence that resignation firms are more likely than dismissal firms to have current (as of the date of the auditor switch) auditor-client disagreements or reportable events. Finally, I find that resignation firms are more likely than dismissal firms to restate prior period financial statements or receive disclaimed audit opinions after the auditor switch.
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$a Business Administration, Accounting.
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$a The University of Chicago.
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摘要
The purpose of this study is to assess the economic characteristics that distinguish firms whose auditor switch is characterized as a resignation from those whose auditor switch is characterized as a dismissal. I propose that auditor concerns over the reliability of the client's financial statements, and the associated litigation or reputation risk, can lead the auditor to end its relationship with the client, and that such switches are more likely to be characterized as resignations than dismissals. I base my predictions on the analytical model in Bockus and Gigler (Journal of Accounting Research (1998)).
In my empirical tests, I use measures related to the misstatement of financial statements to characterize the differences between firms whose switch was characterized as a resignation ("resignation firms") and a matched sample of firms whose switch was characterized as a dismissal ("dismissal firms").
I examine three categories of measures of the risk of financial statement misstatement. "Audit risk assessment" measures correspond to the factors that GAAS asserts to be related to the risk of material misstatement; generally, these measures are observable firm characteristics related to financial distress or poor financial performance and to pre-switch auditor-client conflict, violations of securities laws, and misstatements. "Evaluation of audit test results" measures include current (at the date of the auditor switch) auditor-client disagreements and reportable events. "Ex post evidence of misstatement" measures are related to post-switch corrections of misstatements (restatements and industry-adjusted accruals).
My results are consistent with the resignation disclosure signaling auditor concerns about the reliability of the client's financial statements. I find evidence that the auditor resignation disclosure is significantly associated with client bankruptcy within two years of the auditor switch. I additionally find evidence that resignation firms are more likely than dismissal firms to have current (as of the date of the auditor switch) auditor-client disagreements or reportable events. Finally, I find that resignation firms are more likely than dismissal firms to restate prior period financial statements or receive disclaimed audit opinions after the auditor switch.
附註
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 59-05, Section: A, page: 1653.
Advisers: Katherine Schipper; Mark Zmijewski.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--The University of Chicago, 1998.
合著者
ISBN/ISSN
9780591852868