Financial change and European Union politics [electronic resource] : the origins of Europe's 'market of Nasdaq marketplaces' / Elliot Ashley Posner

Posner, Elliot Ashley
Bib ID
vtls000605275
稽核項
476 p.
電子版
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$a Financial change and European Union politics $h [electronic resource] : $b the origins of Europe's 'market of Nasdaq marketplaces' / $c Elliot Ashley Posner
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$a 476 p.
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$a Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-09, Section: A, page: 3342.
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$a Chair: Steven Weber.
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$a Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2002.
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$a The dissertation explores institutional innovation in European finance and contributes to broad debates about contemporary relations among firms, national authorities and supranational actors. Between 1996 and 2001 the national stock exchanges of Western Europe, controlled by established financial insiders, created twelve new marketplaces explicitly modeled on the American Nasdaq Stock Market. A financial institution at the core of late-twentieth-century American-style capitalism, the Nasdaq gives untested companies access to financing from corporate capital markets. Europe's financial insiders had long opposed this type of innovation and had used their official authorities to block it. They saw in the Nasdaq form a threat to traditional and lucrative national patterns of finance. Why then did they become institutional innovators in the 1990s? The results of my structured comparative study contrast sharply with the leading theories from international and comparative political economy that emphasize either global-level market forces, capital mobility and competition, on the one hand, or domestic-level politics and historical institutional arrangements, on the other. The empirical evidence instead reveals that Europe's financial insiders became institutional innovators primarily in response to the intervention of the European Commission, a supranational political actor. My findings highlight the need to include European Union supranational actors and political processes as significant causes of financial change in Western Europe. I argue that the way forward lies in theories based on contingent propositions that specify the conditions under which supranational actors, national authorities and private firms are likely to drive change processes.
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$a International law and relations.
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$a University of California, Berkeley.
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The dissertation explores institutional innovation in European finance and contributes to broad debates about contemporary relations among firms, national authorities and supranational actors. Between 1996 and 2001 the national stock exchanges of Western Europe, controlled by established financial insiders, created twelve new marketplaces explicitly modeled on the American Nasdaq Stock Market. A financial institution at the core of late-twentieth-century American-style capitalism, the Nasdaq gives untested companies access to financing from corporate capital markets. Europe's financial insiders had long opposed this type of innovation and had used their official authorities to block it. They saw in the Nasdaq form a threat to traditional and lucrative national patterns of finance. Why then did they become institutional innovators in the 1990s? The results of my structured comparative study contrast sharply with the leading theories from international and comparative political economy that emphasize either global-level market forces, capital mobility and competition, on the one hand, or domestic-level politics and historical institutional arrangements, on the other. The empirical evidence instead reveals that Europe's financial insiders became institutional innovators primarily in response to the intervention of the European Commission, a supranational political actor. My findings highlight the need to include European Union supranational actors and political processes as significant causes of financial change in Western Europe. I argue that the way forward lies in theories based on contingent propositions that specify the conditions under which supranational actors, national authorities and private firms are likely to drive change processes.
附註
Source: Dissertation Abstracts International, Volume: 63-09, Section: A, page: 3342.
Chair: Steven Weber.
Thesis (Ph.D.)--University of California, Berkeley, 2002.
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ISBN/ISSN
0493824162